ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
As Web services become widely accepted, there are strong demands to provide services that are secure and which can be used in a secure manner. However, Web services standardization processes usually take a bottom-up approach, and the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) specification (Simple, 2000) , which is used for most Web services, does not define these security-related functions.
Web services often employ intermediary nodes between clients and service providers. In order for the exchanged messages to be protected against altering or eavesdropping even by these intermediaries, it is insufficient to protect only the connections between each node. The message path should be protected all the way through, beginning from the client to the service provider.
To do this, we cannot simply rely on the security mechanisms that are provided in the transport layer, and mechanisms need to be added to the SOAP messages themselves. Message-level security makes it possible for specific parts of the SOAP messages (e.g. credit card numbers) to be digitally signed or encrypted and provides users with fine-grained security control for the messages.
This article describes our implementation of the WS-Security specification that was written to protect SOAP messages. We also point out some performance bottlenecks and propose some possible solutions for the bottlenecks.
WS-SECURITY SPECIFICATION
The Web Services Security (WS-Security) specification ("Web Services Security", 2002 ) is intended to realize message-level security for the exchange of SOAP messages and is undergoing standardization by the OASIS Web Services Security Technical Committee. This section outlines the specification.
Overview
The WS-Security specification defines mechanisms such as digital signatures and encryption so that the SOAP messages will be protected. This specification also defines the syntax for encoding the arbitrary format of the security tokens that are to be embedded into the messages.
Security tokens
A security token represents the abstract concepts such as name, key, and privileges owned by the message sender. The WS-Security specification defines a token containing the username and password (a UsernameToken) and one containing binary formatted objects such as X.509 certificates and Kerberos tickets (a BinarySecurityToken).
Digital signature and encryption
The syntax for digitally signing and encrypting SOAP messages is based on the W3C 
Other functions
The WS-Security specification also defines the format of the message timestamps, the method to send the passwords securely with nonces and timestamps, and so on.
IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented some of the functions defined in the WS-Security Specification, such as the digital signature, encryption, UsernameToken, and so on. This implementation is bundled within IBM WebSphere Application Server, V5.0 (WAS V5; http://www.ibm.com/software/info1/websphere/index.jsp) as released in November 2002. This section describes the implementation.
Architecture and procedure
The Web services implementation in WAS V5 is based on the JSR 109 specification (JSR, 2002) , intended for the integration of Web services and J2EE. The SOAP processor is implemented as a servlet, and it interprets the incoming messages and invokes the appropriate Web services implementations. The actual services are implemented as EJBs according to the JSR 109 specification, and our implementation utilizes a "handler" mechanism as also defined in the JSR 109 specification. Our overall conceptual design is shown in Figure 2 , where the rectangles with dotted borders represent sub-components.
WAS V5
Web container EJB container A handler is a mechanism for performing additional processes on messages. For example logging and caching are possible as additional processes, and the signatures and encryption that we implemented are also packaged in handlers. Handlers are invoked just before a message is sent or just after a message is received. Using this mechanism, messages are signed and/or encrypted just before they are sent, and they are verified and/or decrypted just after they are received. The insertions and verifications of security tokens are also performed by these same handlers. Since this procedure is performed in the same way for request and response messages, 
Relation to operational environment
The WS-Security handler in WAS V5 passes usernames and passwords in the security tokens to the authentication mechanism in WAS V5. The authentication mechanism validates these values according to the specified user registry such as the local OS user registry or the LDAP directory.
If the authentication succeeds, the mechanism attaches the user's ID to the Web service execution thread and the Web service is run under the user's privilege. Otherwise the mechanism throws an exception and the WS-Security handler propagates the exception back to the client in the form of a SOAP fault.
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS
While creating the WS-Security implementation we found several problems that may lead to performance bottlenecks. This and the following sections discuss some of them.
Motivations
At first, our aim was to provide proof-of-concept implementations of XML-and
Web-services-security-related specifications for the market as soon as possible. This was sufficient as long as the Web services were only for early adopters and testers who wanted to make sure that the new concepts actually met their needs. However, as Web services became widely accepted, performance has become an increasing focus of concern. In order for the Web services applications to replace the existing non-Web-services applications such as e-commerce systems, we must show that Web services can achieve security and performance at least equal to the existing applications. While security can be assured to some degree as long as the implementation conforms to the specification, performance largely depends on the way it is implemented. With these concerns we started to measure the performance of our WS-Security implementation to find the bottlenecks.
Measurements
As a first step we measured the performance of the WS-Security handler with various signature and encryption algorithms. The test code accepts a Java InputStream object that represents a SOAP message as its input, processes the WS-Security (i.e., signature and encryption) on the message and discards the result. The sample SOAP message used in the measurements is shown in Figure 4 . The performance measurements throughout this article were conducted using a Pentium-4 2 GHz workstation with 2 GB of memory. The results of the measurement on the WS-Security sender and receiver are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. Here X-and Y-axes denote the combination of signature and encryption algorithms and the processing time in milliseconds, respectively. "RSA_3DES" encryption means that the XML content is encrypted with a randomly generated 3DES key and the key is in turn encrypted with the RSA key. 
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Observations
We can see that most of the processing time is occupied with a set of several operations. Here we discuss each of them.
First, XML parsing requires a certain amount of time for both the sender and the receiver. This is mainly because our code constructs a Document Object Model (DOM) tree (Document, 2000) of the entire SOAP message in memory. While DOM is easily manipulated for signature and encryption, it is inefficient in terms of both time and memory usage. It is also inefficient when the message is very large. In order to solve these problems, we are implementing a stream-based WS-Security processor and trying to avoid this inefficiency. The stream-based processor is described in detail in the next section.
On the other hand, RSA signing and RSA decryption consumes much more time than the other signature and encryption algorithms. This is because of the nature of the RSA algorithm, which involves many modulus calculations. Since the parameters in the RSA private keys are usually much larger than the ones used for the public keys, RSA private key operations (i.e. signing and decryption) require much more time than the public key operations (i.e. verification and encryption). In order to avoid this overhead, we can establish a secure context using the public key pairs of the parties in the message exchange, derive a shared secret from the secure context, and use that for signature and/or encryption. As shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 , shared key operations such as 3DES and HMAC cost very little, and can achieve good performance. The specification named WS-SecureConversation is proposed to meet these requirements. This specification is described after the section on stream-based processing.
In addition, certificate validation also consumes a lot of time at the receiver side. When an RSA signature is used, an X.509 certificate is embedded in the message for the use in the signature verification, as shown in Figure 1 . In order to trust the certificate, it is not enough to validate the certificate alone but the trusted chain of the certificates including the incoming certificate must be established. Our WS-Security code uses Java CertPath API to validate the incoming certificates. Inevitably the validation process involves many cryptographic operations and should be avoided as much as possible. In order to meet this goal, WS-SecureConversation can be utilized as well, because it can eliminate the usage of the RSA signing (and therefore the certificate validation).
STREAM-BASED PROCESSOR
We have implemented a prototype of a stream-based WS-Security processor in order to avoid the inefficiency of DOM. This section describes the details of the processor, including the achieved performance improvements.
Overview
We designed the stream-based processor based on the new event model, instead of relying on DOM. By adopting a stream-based architecture, we expected to achieve efficiency in terms of both time and memory even when the message is very large.
On the receiver side, an event-driven XML parser is used and our processor performs WS-Security processing on the message as a parsing event (i.e. start or end of the element) is received from the parser, without constructing a DOM. The processed event-stream is passed to the underlying SOAP engine.
On the sender side, the processor is integrated into the serialization code in the SOAP engine that writes the generated SOAP message object into the network. Our processor intercepts the serialization event (i.e. start or end of the element) and performs WS-Security processing on the message as the event is received, without constructing a DOM. The serialization code in the SOAP engine writes out the WS-Security-processed SOAP message to the network.
In the course of designing the event-based API, we found a problem in character code conversions. The SOAP messages exchanged via networks are in the format of byte arrays with encoding indicators. This format is inconvenient for manipulation and UTF-16 formatted characters and strings are used inside the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). However, the XML canonicalization (Canonical, 2001) used for XML signatures requires its output to be UTF-8.
Therefore, SOAP messages are converted from byte arrays to UTF-16 strings by the XML parser, and then converted to UTF-8 by the XML signature processor. Character code conversion generally requires memory allocation proportional to the size of the original data and this may cause performance degradation, especially when the message is large. We concluded that just using the Simple API for XML (SAX; http://www.saxproject.org/) was not enough because it uses Java UTF-16 strings, and so we implemented the processor to avoid the unneeded character code conversions.
Measurements
We measured the performance of our stream-based WS-Security processor under the same conditions as the measurements shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 . For the sender-side measurement, we prepared a dummy serializer that emits serialization events from an
InputStream object. The results of the measurements on the sender and receiver are shown in In order to show the scalability of the stream-based WS-Security processor, we also measured its processing time and memory usage with various message sizes. Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the processing time and the memory usage respectively. Here the X-axis denotes the size of SOAP message to be processed, in bytes. The HMAC signature and 3DES encryption are used, and the memory usage data is collected from the garbage collection log in the JVM.
Observations
Figure 9 tells us that a stream-based processor can achieve good performance with all of the combinations of signature and encryption algorithms, on both the sender and receiver sides. The ratio of the improvement varies, from 64-82% on the sender side and from 46-80% on the receiver side. We believe these improvements come from avoiding the DOM construction and character code conversions. Therefore it can be said that the relative significance of parsing the XML messages in the overall processing time was greatly decreased, and the overhead in the cryptographic operations is becoming dominant. As for the scalability, the results shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11imply that the stream processing achieves a better scaling factor in terms of both the processing time and the memory usage. This is summarized in Table 1 . The improvements at the receiver side are more significant than on the sender side, because the DOM-based receiver has to parse the XML from a byte array and construct a DOM twice, when the SOAP message is received and when the encrypted message is decrypted. While the DOM-based sender parses the XML and constructs a DOM once, the stream-based receiver does not construct a DOM at all. That is the reason why the stream-based receiver can offer better scalability. In general, it can be concluded that the stream-based approach is very promising in terms of both performance and scalability, although the current implementation is a prototype and it leaves much room for refinement and tuning (Tamura et al., 2003) .
WS-SECURECONVERSATION
In order to avoid expensive public key operations, the Web Services Secure Conversation (WS-SecureConversation) specification ("Web Services Secure", 2002) can be used. This section quickly outlines the specification and shows its effectiveness in improving WS-Security performance.
Motivations
WS-Security is often compared to SSL (Freier et al., 1996) in that both are designed to provide security in the data exchange. As stated in the Introduction, although there is a big difference in that WS-Security is at the message level while SSL is at the transport level, we have to convince customers that WS-Security can be a replacement for SSL at a reasonable cost in order to encourage the wide adoption of WS-Security.
However, the overhead of SSL data transfer is on the order of 0.1 ms (Apostolopoulos et al., 1999) . As shown in Figure 5 , this is far lower than the overhead of WS-Security with RSA, which is an algorithm often used for XML signature and encryption. This is because shared key encryption is employed in SSL data transfer. The SSL protocol is divided into two parts:
handshake and data transfer. The handshake establishes a secure context containing a shared secret value using the public keys of the sender and the receiver. Then the data transfer uses the shared key which has been derived from the secure context. Therefore, the expensive public key operations are needed only in the handshake phase and the data transfer can be performed with a very low cost, using the shared key. The WS-SecureConversation framework can be used for our purpose of improving the performance of message exchanges. That is, first the communicating parties can exchange their information such as their public keys, and then they create a Security Context from the exchanged information. After the Security Context is established, they can derive the shared key for the context and securely communicate with each other. In this way, the expensive public key operations are performed only once in the Security Context establishment phase, and high performance shared key operation are used afterwards. This approach enables WS-Security operations based on the shared key signature and encryption, and its performance is expected to be as high as the "{HMAC, 3DES}" column in Figure 7 . We are now implementing the WS-SecureConversation as an add-on to our WS-Security processor. Once the implementation is done, the ratio of WS-Security performance to the normal Web services performance will be closer to the ratio of SSL performance to the normal HTTP performance (He, 2003) . We recognize that the performance is critical in product environments and customers will not adopt the system and switch from the existing applications to Web services unless they can be sure that the Web services can achieve security and performance as good as the existing applications.
WS-SecureConversation overview
In that sense, we consider the implementation of WS-SecureConversation to be very important and we firmly believe it will contribute greatly to the wide deployment of Web services.
CONCLUSION
We showed performance improvements for a WS-Security processor. Through the performance measurements on the processor, we found the bottlenecks in the XML parsing and the public key operations. In order to reduce the overhead of XML parsing, we implemented a prototype of a stream-based WS-Security processor which is event-based and avoids the DOM construction and character code conversions. In the best cases, the stream-based processor offers about 80% performance improvement in comparison to the current DOM-based processor, for both the processing time and the memory usage. In order to avoid the expensive public key operations, we also introduced WS-SecureConversation to establish a secure context between the communicating parties. This can be compared to the SSL approach, where the actual data transfer is done with very high performance using shared keys, after the secure context is established using the public key information. With WS-SecureConversation it is expected that WS-Security will be utilized with reasonable performance and contribute to the wide deployment of Web services.
